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Law includes a system of authorized coercion in which force is used to
maintain and enhance public order objectives and in which unauthorized
coercions are prohibited. Thus law and coercion are not dialectical op-
posites. On the contrary, formal legal arrangements are not made when
there is a spontaneous social uniformity; then there is no need for law.
Law is made when there is disagreement; the more effective members of
the group concerned impose their vision of common interest through the
instrument of law with its program of sanctions. Law acknowledges the
utility and the inescapability of the use of coercion in social processes,
but seeks to organize, monopolize, and economize it.
I
The international legal system diverges from these general legal fea-
tures only in terms of degree of organization and centralization of the use
of coercion. In national systems, coercion is organized, relatively cen-
tralized, and, for the most part, monopolized by the apparatus of the
state. In the international system, it is not. Individual actors historically
have reserved the right to use force unilaterally to protect and vindicate
legal entitlements.
Political and jurisprudential principles such as these must be kept in
mind in an examination and rational interpretation of Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter. Its sweeping prohibition of the threat or use of
force in international politics was not an autonomous ethical affirmation
of nonviolence any more than were previous efforts to temper the sav-
agery of international politics. Article 2(4) was embedded in and made
initially plausible by a complex security scheme, established and spelled
out in the United Nations Charter. If the scheme had operated, it would
have obviated the need for the unilateral use of force. States with a griev-
ance could have repaired to the Security Council, which could then apply
the appropriate quantum and form of authoritative coercion and thereby
vindicate collectively the rights it found had been violated. Under these
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circumstances, the need for and justification of a unilateral resort to force
ceased. Even then, as we will see, the Charter acknowledged the inherent
limits of its structures in the prevailing international politics by reserving
to states the right of self-defense.
But the security system of the United Nations was premised on a con-
sensus between the permanent members of the Security Council. Lamen-
tably, that consensus dissolved early in the history of the organization.
Thereafter, for almost all cases but those in which there was a short-term
interest in collaboration, the Security Council could not operate as origi-
nally planned. Part of the systemic justification for the theory of Article
2(4) disappeared. At the same time, the Soviet Union announced, in ef-
fect, that it did not accept Article 2(4): "Wars of national liberation," an
open-textured conception essentially meaning wars the Soviets sup-
ported, were not, in the Soviet conception, violations of Article 2(4).
Arkady N. Shevehenko testified:
[T]he refusal to abandon support for national liberation movements as a
weapon against the Western Powers, and persistent efforts by the Kremlin
to penetrate the nations of the Third World for the purpose of luring them
into its orbit, imply a willingness to project Soviet military power over the
globe and risk, if necessary, conventional wars. Here again, the Soviets are
guided by Lenin's formulas, which state that "socialists cannot be opposed
to all wars," particularly "revolutionary wars" or national wars by "colo-
nial peoples for liberation" or civil wars. Consequently, the Soviet leader-
ship favors and instigates some local conventional wars. In explaining the
Soviet military doctrine in 1981, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov called
attempts to attribute to the U.S.S.R. a willingness to launch the "first nu-
clear strike" unfounded nonsense, but he said nothing regarding conven-
tional war.1
Thus the U.S.S.R. could continue to pay lip service to Article 2(4) while
ignoring it in practice whenever convenient.
The international political system has largely accommodated itself to
the indispensability of coercion in a legal system, on the one hand, and
the deterioration of the Charter system, on the other, by developing a
nuanced code for appraising the lawfulness of individual unilateral uses
of force. The net result is not the value sterility of nineteenth century
international legal conceptions of coercion, but neither is it Article 2(4).
Some sense of the complexity of the code can be gained by examining, in
a single time period, 1979, forceful unilateral interventions without the
prior authorization of the United Nations.
In 1979, forces of Tanzania invaded Uganda, expelled the government
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of Idi Amin, and ultimately restored the government of Milton Obote.
In the same year, French forces, in a quick and bloodless coup, expelled
the government of Jean-Bedel Bokassa from the Central African Repub-
lic and installed a different president. In the same year, forces of the
government of Vietnam entered Cambodia and sought to unseat the Pol
Pot government and to replace it with a Vietnamese-backed government
led by Heng Samrin. And in the same year, Soviet forces entered Af-
ghanistan to support a government which, it seemed, would not have
survived had it not been for the timely intervention and continued pres-
ence and operation of a foreign military force. This annus, to paraphrase
Auden, was not mirabilis.
Although efforts were made to arouse the United Nations to criticize
the first two of these interventions, the organization resisted. 'But the
organization condemned the latter two. Since all of these interventions,
like all unilateral actions, were motivated in key part by the self-interest
of the actors concerned, we must assume that there were some additional
ingredients that rendered some of them internationally acceptable. I sub-
mit that it is in the identification of those factors that one can begin to
describe the contemporary international law on the use of force.
II
The deterioration of the Charter security regime has stimulated a par-
tial revival of a type of unilateraljus ad bellum. But in sharp contrast to
the nineteenth century conception, which was value-neutral and ulti-
mately power-based, the contemporary doctrine relates only to the vindi-
cation of rights which the international community recognizes but has, in
general or in a particular case, demonstrated an inability to secure or
guarantee. Hence, appraisals of state resort to coercion can no longer
simply condemn them by invoking Article 2(4), but must test permissibil-
ity or lawfulness by reference to a number of factors, including the objec-
tive and the contingency for which coercion is being applied.
Nine basic categories appear to have emerged in which one finds vary-
ing support for unilateral uses of force. They are self-defense, which has
been construed quite broadly; self-determination and decolonization; hu-
manitarian intervention; intervention by the military instrument to re-
place an elite in another state; uses of the military instrument within
spheres of influence and critical defense zones; treaty-sanctioned inter-
ventions within the territory of another state; use of the military instru-
ment for the gathering of evidence in international proceedings; use of
the military instrument to enforce international judgments; and counter-
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measures such as reprisals and retorsions. The categories themselves,
however, are not determinative.
Merely locating an individual use of force in a particular category does
not mean that it is lawful. While practice varies with regard to each of
these, it is significant that a number have certain common factors. In the
space allotted by the editors, I cannot develop a comprehensive set of
guidelines for assessing lawfulness or permissibility of coercion, but I will
suggest what I believe are the major principles of the UN Charter in this
regard and try to relate them to our subject.
In the determination of any action, a key and constant factor-less a
criterion of lawfulness and more a sine qua non of survival-is the need
for the maintenance of minimum order in a precarious international sys-
tem. Will a particular use of force, whatever its justification otherwise,
enhance or undermine world order?
When this requirement is met, attention may be directed to the funda-
mental principle of political legitimacy in contemporary international
politics. It is, as anyone familiar with the UN Charter and with such key
constitutive decisions as Namibia2 and Western Sahara3 knows, the en-
hancement of the ongoing right of peoples to determine their own polit-
ical destinies. That obvious point bears renewed emphasis, for it is, in
my view, the main purpose of contemporary international law: Article
2(4) is the means. The basic policy of contemporary international law
has been to maintain the political independence of territorial communi-
ties so that they can continue to be able to express their ongoing desire
for political organization in a form appropriate to them. Article 2(4),
like so much in the Charter and in contemporary international politics,
supports and must be interpreted in terms of this key postulate. Each
application of Article 2(4) must enhance opportunities for ongoing self-
determination. Though all interventions are lamentable, the fact is that
some may serve, in terms of aggregate consequences, to increase the
probability of the free choice of peoples about their government and
political structure. Others have the manifest objective and consequence
of doing exactly the opposite.
There is, thus, neither need nor justification for treating in a mechani-
cally equal fashion, Tanzania's intervention in Uganda to overthrow the
Amin despotism, on the one hand, and Soviet intervention in Hungary or
Czechoslovakia to overthrow popular governments and to impose an un-
desired regime on a coerced population, on the other. Nor should the
2. 1971 I.C.J. 16.
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different appraisal of these cases by the international legal system occa-
sion any surprise.
III
It is important to remember that norms are instruments devised by
human beings to precipitate desired social consequences. One should not
seek a point-for-point conformity to a rule without constant regard for
the policy or principle that animated its prescription, with appropriate
regard for the factual constellation in the minds of the drafters. Legal
statements, like all others, are made in a context whose features are part
of the expectations of speaker and audience. The expression of Article
2(4), in the form of a rule, is premised, I submit, on a political context
and a technological environment which has been changing inexorably
since the end of the nineteenth century. The rule assumes that the only
threat to or usurpation of the right of political independence of a people
within a particular territorial community is from external and overt inva-
sion. It makes a historicist assumption as well: internal changes are
deemed to be personnel changes in the composition of an elite which do
not bring about basic changes in systems of public order within the coun-
try or in its external political alignments; governments come and go but
the life of the people continues in its traditional fashion. Most important,
it does not presuppose division, maintained by a precarious nuclear equi-
poise, between two contending public order systems, either of which
might find itself substantially disadvantaged and pressed to intense coer-
cion by the defection of a particular community from its own critical
defense zone.
The rule-formulation of Article 2(4) is oblivious to these factors.
Hence, its purpose notwithstanding, it has been unable to provide would-
be strict appliers with a legal characterization consistent with the rele-
vant international policies for all-too-familiar scenarios:
In communities without established or durably institutionalized procedures
for the transfer of power, a group of military officers, without a base of
popular support, seizes the government. In an equally familiar variation of
this scenario, the putsch itself is externally inspired, encouraged and/or fi-
nanced. As their control is precarious, the officers immediately seek the
support of an outside Superpower; it responds by providing military and
administrative assistance within the country and material help and support
in external political arenas. Because of this foreign reinforcement, what
would probably have been an evanescent violation of the popular will per-
sists. Ironically, most of the sequences of this scenario are compatible with
traditional international law and Article 2(4) as it has been mechanically
applied. The usurpers of power are entitled to recognition as a government
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if they appear to have effective control, a doctrine established clearly since
Chief Justice Taft's holding in Tinoco. As such, the new "government" is
entitled to request assistance from abroad. Other governments responding
to it are not deemed to be "intervening," yet another foreign force, entering
the country, putting the mutinous military back in the barracks and rein-
stalling the ousted government and the former constitutional procedures
would violate the terms of Article 2(4).
4
The net effect of a mechanical interpretation of Article 2(4) may be to
superimpose on an unwilling polity an elite, an ideology, and an external
alignment alien to its wishes. This may entail far-reaching social and
economic changes and grave deprivations of human rights for substantial
numbers and strata of the population. Recall that all of this occurs in a
century whose politics are marked by relentless mass mobilization, with
frequent, radical, and far-reaching intervention by the apparatus of the
state.
In consequential terms, the scenarios we have rehearsed are as destruc-
tive of the political independence of the community concerned as would
be a massive invasion by the armed forces of another state. To character-
ize the second form of intervention per se as impermissible or unlawful
and the first as permissible or lawful or at least not cognizable by interna-
tional law violates the basic policy which international law seeks to
achieve.
IV
Coercion should not be glorified. The promulgation of a norm such as
Article 2(4), for all of its ineffectiveness, is a major achievement. But it is
naive and indeed subversive of public order to insist that coercion never
be used, for coercion is a ubiquitous feature of all social life and a charac-
teristic and indispensable component of law. In a contest with an adver-
sary that does not accept the prohibition, to forswear force is to disarm
unilaterally.
The critical question, in a decentralized international security system
such as ours, is not whether coercion has been applied but whether it has
been applied in support of or against community order and basic poli-
cies, and whether it has been applied in ways whose net consequences
include increased congruence with community goals and minimum or-
der. Given the magnitude of destructive power of the weapons con-
cerned and the violence and wickedness of which human beings have
demonstrated themselves capable, the notion of ineffective international
4. Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 642, 644-45 (1984).
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institutions and hence a decentralized security system is terrifying. But it
is a fact. We do not enhance security, minimum order, or the values of
human dignity which require and justify them by pretending otherwise,
any more than does an ostrich enhance its security by putting its head in
the sand at the approach of danger. The possibility of making the secur-
ity functions of the United Nations effective in the near future is slim.
The effort to improve the organization is always important and justified.
But in the meanwhile, rational and responsible decisions will have to be
made in the many cases that continue to present themselves. For them,
an important part of the control on impermissible coercion will be a
clear conception of the licit community objectives for which coercion
may be used: the basic and enduring values of contemporary world pub-
lic order and human dignity.
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